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When reading about scientific topics, people often read 
texts that present evidence and arguments that are incon-
sistent with their previously held beliefs. For example, a 
student may read in an introductory psychology textbook 
that developmental twin studies indicate that homosexual-
ity is partly determined by environmental influences 
(Lillienfeld, Lynn, Namy, & Woolf, 2014). If this student 
had believed that homosexuality was genetically deter-
mined, she may change her belief as a result of reading this 
information. Indeed, evidence suggests that belief change 
sometimes occurs as a consequence of reading scientific 
texts (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Kardash & Scholes, 1995; 
Murphy, Long, Holleran, & Esterly, 2003; Murphy & 
Mason, 2006; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004). The primary 
goal of this research was to examine whether people dem-
onstrate metacognitive awareness of belief change. This 
awareness was measured by examining the discrepancy 
between a person’s current belief, their previously reported 
belief and their recollection of that initial belief. Awareness 
of belief change is an under studied issue, but may be an 
important factor in people’s metacognitive understanding 
of their own comprehension. If people show little aware-
ness of changes in their own beliefs, they may erroneously 
conclude that their beliefs are more fixed than they actu-
ally are, and consequently may be less willing to engage 
with information that is contrary to their beliefs.
In this research, beliefs are defined as a statement about 
the truth value of a proposition (Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001; 
Wolfe & Griffin, in press). Beliefs are distinguished from 
attitudes, which contain an affective component that 
describes how a person feels or whether they wish some-
thing to be true or not (Ajzen, 2001). For example, the stu-
dent who believes homosexuality is genetically determined 
may or may not wish for that to be the case. Beliefs are 
also distinguished from knowledge in that we store propo-
sitional or perceptual representations about many things 
(Alexander, Schallert, & Hare, 1991), some of which we 
do not believe to be real (such as fictional characters). We 
also can understand claims, such as that vaccines cause 
autism, without believing them to be true. In the literature 
on conceptual change, misconceptions are beliefs under 
this definition (Sinatra & Broughton, 2011). For example, 
a belief that the earth is flat is a statement of truth value, 
regardless of the person’s attitude or whether that state-
ment corresponds with scientific evidence. Some scientific 
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topics, such as evolution, show varied beliefs among 
people despite broad scientific consensus (Sinatra, 
Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). Other sci-
entific topics have varied beliefs and considerably less sci-
entific consensus, such as effects of media violence on 
actual violence (Boxer, Groves, & Docherty, 2015; 
Ferguson, 2015). The current research addresses beliefs 
about contentious topics for which beliefs vary and that 
can be studied scientifically.
Belief change and awareness of belief 
change
Research on belief change after reading argumentative 
texts suggests that change is inconsistent and not fully 
understood. People do sometimes change beliefs after 
reading belief inconsistent texts (Kardash & Scholes, 
1995; Murphy et al., 2003; Slusher & Anderson, 1996). In 
experiments where this has occurred, subjects report 
beliefs before and after they read a one-sided text that pre-
sents evidence and arguments relating to the topic. Other 
studies show no evidence of belief change (Nyhan, Reifler, 
Richey, & Freed, 2014; Prasad et al., 2009) and suggest 
that people engage in a variety of strategies to maintain 
their current beliefs (Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Lombardi, 
Nussbaum, & Sinatra, 2016). Thus, in order to assess 
metacognitive awareness of belief change, we needed to 
create an experimental situation in which at least some 
subjects would change beliefs in response to reading a 
text. To accomplish this, we identified factors in previous 
research that were associated with belief change. Low 
knowledge readers may be more likely than high knowl-
edge readers to change beliefs (Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel, 
2013). Texts with causal explanations of phenomena lead 
to greater belief change than texts without causal explana-
tions (Slusher & Anderson, 1996). Furthermore, Dole and 
Sinatra (1998) propose that belief change is more likely 
when readers are relatively uncommitted in terms of the 
strength of their belief. In the current research, subjects 
read about spanking effectiveness. This topic was chosen 
because the subject population (undergraduates) is typi-
cally unfamiliar with the research on spanking effective-
ness, their beliefs on this topic are varied, and research 
based texts could be created for both sides of the issue. 
Moreover, we reasoned that the vast majority of the sub-
jects that were tested did not have children of their own 
and therefore would hold relatively uncommitted views on 
the topic.
Experiments on belief change in science or social sci-
ence domains do not address whether people are aware of 
their own belief change. One potential method for estab-
lishing awareness of belief change is to ask people if their 
beliefs changed after reading. This method has been used 
in some attitude change experiments (Corner, Whitmarsh, 
& Xenias, 2012; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Miller, 
McHoskey, Bane, & Down, 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997). 
However, a perceived change in attitude can only be accu-
rately assessed if the subjects have an accurate recollection 
of their previous attitude. In fact, Corner et al. (2012), 
Miller et al. (1993) and Munro and Ditto (1997) found 
inconsistent results when comparing pre and post attitude 
measures with perceived attitude change. A more valid 
method to assess awareness of belief change is for subjects 
to recollect their initial beliefs after they have read a text 
and reported their post-reading beliefs. The difference (or 
similarity) between initial beliefs and recollection of initial 
beliefs thus constitutes a measure of their metacognitive 
awareness of change.
Although metacognitive awareness of belief change has 
not been examined, there is extensive research in the area 
of comprehension monitoring (e.g., Maki, Shields, 
Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005; Wiley, Griffin, & Thiede, 
2005). This research suggests that people often have a rela-
tively poor awareness of the extent to which they under-
stand expository texts (Maki et al., 2005; Thiede, Griffin, 
Wiley, & Anderson, 2010), as evidenced by generally low 
correlations between comprehension judgments and test 
performance. This literature also suggests that people do 
not have direct access to the quality of their memory rep-
resentations (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013). Instead, two 
types of mechanisms have been proposed that may under-
lie metacognitive judgments of comprehension. First, peo-
ple may use available cues in memory such as retrieval 
fluency to make judgments of comprehension success. 
Benjamin, Bjork and Schwartz (1998) had subjects answer 
trivia questions, then rate the probability they could recall 
the answers on a later free recall test. Results showed that 
the faster subjects answered the trivia questions, the greater 
they rated their probability of correctly recalling the 
answer. Their actual recollection performance showed the 
opposite pattern; the answers that were later recalled the 
best were the ones that subjects recalled most slowly. 
These results suggest that retrieval fluency influenced 
judgments of memory, but those judgments were inaccu-
rate when compared to actual memory performance. A sec-
ond possible explanation that may account for this 
inaccuracy is that judgments are based on beliefs about 
cognitive processing (Mueller, Dunlosky, & Tauber, 2016). 
If people believe that a certain factor (such as familiarity 
of content or similarity between items) is related to com-
prehension success, then comprehension judgments will 
vary based on these beliefs.
Metacognitive awareness of attitude 
change
A number of researchers in social psychology have exam-
ined people’s awareness of attitude change about certain 
topics. These studies show evidence of a recollection bias 
such that following attitude change, recollection of 
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previously held attitudes are biased toward the direction of 
current attitudes (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & 
Reckman, 1973; Levine, 1997; Levine, Lench, & Safer, 
2009; Levine & Safer, 2002; Markus, 1986; McFarland & 
Ross, 1987; Ross, 1989). In a classic study involving atti-
tude change, Goethals and Reckman (1973) examined 
high school students’ attitudes toward bussing to achieve 
racial integration. Students first reported their attitudes; 
some thought bussing should take place, whereas others 
thought the opposite. Students then participated in small 
group discussions with others who held the same attitude. 
In each group, one confederate argued strongly for the 
opposite of the group position. After the discussion, stu-
dents tended to shift attitudes in the direction of the con-
federate’s argument position. The authors of the study 
found that recollections of students’ initial attitudes were 
more similar to their current attitudes than to their actual 
initial attitudes. Other examples of similarly biased recol-
lection errors include dating satisfaction (McFarland & 
Ross, 1987) and political opinions (Markus, 1986). Taken 
together, these recollection errors about previous attitudes 
suggest poor metacognitive awareness of these changes.
Ross (1989) proposed a theory of recollection bias in 
which people hold implicit theories about the extent to 
which aspects of our selves change over time. First, cur-
rent attitudes about the topic in question are considered. 
Second, an implicit theory about stability or change is 
applied to determine whether it is likely that previous atti-
tudes were similar to the current one. According to the 
theory, recollections of previous attitudes are reconstructed 
based on the assumption that the previous attitude is likely 
to be similar or different to the current one. For example, 
Ross (1989) interpreted the Goethals and Reckman (1973) 
data by proposing that the students adopted a theory of sta-
bility. By assuming their attitudes were stable, the change 
in attitudes led to large recollection errors about their pre-
vious attitudes. Ross’ (1989) theory relates to the metacog-
nition literature in that he proposes beliefs rather than 
retrieval fluency as the critical component to people’s 
reconstruction of their previous attitudes.
Research goals
Based on the literatures in comprehension monitoring and 
attitude change, we predict that when people change 
beliefs as a result of reading, they will display biased rec-
ollection of their initial beliefs. We propose that people 
form a mental representation of text information along 
with associated knowledge, inferences and any interpreta-
tions of text content (Kintsch, 1998). We contend that cur-
rent beliefs are reported based on salient information at the 
time they are generated. Moreover, recollection of previ-
ous beliefs will also be generated based on currently avail-
able information, along with any beliefs or assumptions 
about whether belief change has occurred. Thus, we 
propose that belief change is typically inaccessible and not 
subject to metacognitive awareness. We hypothesize that 
following belief change, people will demonstrate poor rec-
ollection of their initial beliefs. We further hypothesize 
that the magnitude of people’s recollection errors will be 
mediated by their level of belief change.
In order to more fully understand metacognitive aware-
ness of belief change, relationships are examined between 
recollection accuracy of initial beliefs, and processing and 
mental representation of the text information. Processing 
refers to the mental activities that readers engage in as they 
read, whereas the mental representation refers to the mem-
ory that readers form as a result of reading (Graesser, 
Millis, & Zwaan, 1997). To date, no experiments have 
examined the relationship between these factors and meta-
cognitive awareness of belief or attitude change. Studies in 
the comprehension monitoring literature suggest that peo-
ple who perform better on exams make more accurate 
exam predictions (Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, & Allen, 2005; 
Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2005). However, Maki et al. 
(2005) found no relationship between verbal ability and 
metacomprehension accuracy. In an attempt to shed fur-
ther light on this mixed evidence, we included several 
measures that assessed subjects’ processing and memory 
of the text content.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, subjects read either a belief consistent or 
belief inconsistent text describing the scientific literature 
related to spanking effectiveness. Beliefs were collected in 
a prescreening questionnaire prior to the experimental ses-
sion. Post-reading beliefs and belief recollections were 
collected at the end of the experimental session. Argument-
focused processing was assessed with sentence-by-sen-
tence reading times (Wolfe, Tanner, & Taylor, 2013) in 
order to determine the extent to which subjects sped up or 
slowed down reading as a function of the strength of the 
arguments in the text. The mental representation of text 
content was assessed with a sentence recognition task and 
a short answer task.
Method
Subjects. One hundred twenty eight subjects from a large 
Midwestern University in the United States participated in 
exchange for partial credit in an Introductory Psychology 
course. Subjects were selected from a pool of 548 who 
qualified based on their responses to an on-line prescreen-
ing test at the beginning of the semester (described below). 
Seventy two subjects believed that spanking was an effec-
tive means of discipline, whereas 56 believed that it was 
ineffective. The mean age of the subjects was 19.03 (stand-
ard deviation [SD] = 2.62) and 69% were female. The 
racial makeup of the subjects was 57% Caucasian, 6% 
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African American, 3% Asian American, 3% Hispanic and 
31% other/did not respond.
Materials. Two texts were created that present one-sided 
arguments regarding the scientific literature related to the 
effects of spanking as a means of discipline (see the online 
Supplemental Material for the texts). In the “Pro” text, evi-
dence is presented suggesting that spanking is an effective 
means of discipline. One section of the Pro text discusses 
methodological flaws in the studies that suggest spanking 
is harmful. Other sections discuss data suggesting that the 
appropriate application of spanking results in increased 
child compliance, and the negative effects of Sweden’s 
national ban on spanking. In the “Con” text, one section 
discusses short-term effects of spanking, indicating that 
the data on short-term effectiveness are mixed and incon-
clusive. Another section discusses negative long-term out-
comes associated with spanking, and outlines the criticisms 
of this research. The Con text also discusses Sweden’s 
spanking ban, suggesting that claims of increased adoles-
cent violence following the ban are misleading and incor-
rect. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics.
Prior knowledge of the scientific study of spanking was 
assessed with a 10-question multiple choice test. A short 
answer questionnaire with 10 questions was created for 
each text. Some of the questions could be answered with 
information directly in the texts, whereas other questions 
required inferences. One point was awarded for each cor-
rect response, and some questions have an open-ended 
number of possible responses, so the number of possible 
points on the short answer questionnaires was open ended.
Thirty sentences from each text (Pro and Con) were 
selected for the sentence recognition task based on the 
results of an earlier rating study. In the rating study, each 
subject rated sentences for either the Pro or Con text, and 
provided either support or refute ratings with respect to the 
proposition that spanking is effective. Ten subjects were in 
each of the four conditions. Support was defined as “to 
prove correct by evidence or argument”, while refute was 
defined as “to prove wrong by evidence or argument.” 
Each sentence appeared individually on the computer 
screen along with a 1-9 rating scale. In both cases, higher 
ratings corresponded to stronger support/refute. Subjects 
proceeded through the sentences of the assigned text at 
their own pace. The support or refute rating for a sentence 
is defined as the mean rating across the 10 subjects. To 
select sentences for the sentence recognition task, the 10 
sentences that received the highest support ratings and the 
10 with the highest refute ratings from each text were used. 
Ten sentences were also selected that had neutral scores on 
both support and refute ratings. Thus, a total of 30 sen-
tences from the Pro and 30 from the Con text were selected 
(10 each of supporting, refuting and neutral from each 
text). Half the sentences were old and half new regardless 
of which text a subject read. Among the 60 total sentences, 
20 sentences were supportive of the proposition, 20 refuted 
it and 20 were neutral. See Table 1 for the mean support 
and refute ratings, and the online Supplemental Material 
for the sentences used.
Procedure. Subjects’ reported their initial spanking beliefs 
as part of a prescreening survey they completed within the 
first 2 weeks of the semester. The online survey was self-
paced, and contained unrelated questions pertaining to 
other experiments. Subjects reported their belief in the 
proposition that spanking is an effective way to discipline 
a child on a nine-point scale (1 = “completely disbelieve”, 
5 = “unsure whether I believe this” and 9 = “completely 
believe.”) Subjects who responded 1-3 on the belief scale 
were classified as “disbelievers” and subjects who 
responded 7-9 were classified as “believers.” Subjects then 
completed a belief basis scale (Griffin, 2008) which meas-
ures subjects’ reasons for holding beliefs. Belief basis did 
not consistently predict any measures of interest, and 
therefore is not discussed further. Subjects also responded 
to questions about their level of knowledge regarding the 
scientific study of spanking, how important the issue was 
to them personally and how much they cared about the 
issue. Believers and disbelievers were invited by email to 
participate in the experiment.
The experiment took place 7-11 weeks after the pre-
screening. All parts of the experiment were run at com-
puter terminals, with up to four subjects per session. 
Subjects began by completing the multiple choice, ‘sci-
entific knowledge of spanking’ test. Both spanking texts 
(Pro and Con) defined spanking as “striking a child’s but-
tocks when he or she misbehaves.” Reading instructions 
stated that subjects would read a text presenting evidence 
on one side of the issue. Within believers and disbeliev-
ers, subjects were randomly assigned to read either the 
Pro or Con text. Thus, half the subjects read a belief con-
sistent text and half read a belief inconsistent text. 
Subjects read the texts one sentence at a time in a moving 
window format. For each paragraph, all sentences except 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the Pro and Con texts.
Pro text Con text
Paragraphs 18 16
Words 1870 1942
Flesch-Kincaid grade level 11.5 12.2
Sentence recognition ratings
 Support 8.21 (0.30) 6.63 (0.74)
 Neutral 5.06 (0.06) 4.38 (0.12)
 Refute 7.77 (.059) 8.45 (0.29)
Sentence recognition ratings are the mean (SD) ratings for the 10 
sentences of each type that were used in the sentence recognition task. 
Ratings are on a 1-9 scale with large numbers indicating the sentences 
were rated as supporting/refuting the proposition that spanking is 
effective.
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the sentence being read were obscured by dashes. 
Subjects were instructed to read each sentence until they 
understood it, then press the spacebar. At that point, the 
current sentence turned back into dashes and the next 
sentence turned from dashes to text. At the end of the 
text, subjects took a 5-min break.
Subjects then completed the sentence recognition task. 
All 60 sentences were presented one at a time, randomized 
for each subject. Instructions stated that subjects should 
decide if each sentence was presented word-for-word in 
the text they read. If so, they pressed a button labeled 
“old”, and if not, they pressed the “new” button. Following 
the recognition test, subjects completed the short answer 
test. Subjects were instructed to answer the questions in 
order and to type their answers directly into Microsoft 
Word. Next, subjects answered the post-reading belief 
questions. Subjects first reported their belief about whether 
spanking is an effective means of discipline (referred to as 
“post-reading belief”). This question was identical to the 
prescreening belief question and was presented by itself on 
an otherwise blank sheet of paper. After subjects responded, 
the experimenter collected the question and gave subjects 
another sheet of paper with the prescreening belief recol-
lection question. On the same scale that was used previ-
ously, subjects were instructed to recall their response to 
this question at the beginning of the semester by circling 
the number that was “the same as your answer at the begin-
ning of the semester.” Finally, subjects were debriefed and 
dismissed.
Results
Results address the questions that arise from the hypothe-
ses stated earlier. Namely, when subjects experience belief 
change after reading a belief inconsistent scientific text, do 
they show poor recollection of their initial beliefs? 
Moreover, is the relationship between the belief consist-
ency of the text read and belief recollection accuracy 
mediated by belief change? Finally, we examine whether 
belief recollection accuracy is related to processing or 
mental representation of the text.
Initial beliefs, text position and belief change. We examined 
initial and post-reading beliefs to establish that the texts 
elicited more belief change when they were belief incon-
sistent versus belief consistent. It was important to estab-
lish that belief change occurred among at least some of our 
subjects, and we sought to reduce the belief status and text 
position variables into two conditions that represented 
whether subjects read a belief consistent or inconsistent 
text. With this goal in mind, we conducted a mixed meas-
ures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with initial belief 
(believer vs disbeliever) and text position (pro vs con) as 
predictors of belief ratings (initial vs post-reading). To 
capture the belief strength of subjects, independent of 
whether they were believers or disbelievers, belief ratings 
for believers were reverse scored to align with disbeliev-
ers. As a result, this measure indicates more extreme 
beliefs at lower values and more moderate beliefs at higher 
values. The analysis showed that initial beliefs (M = 2.15, 
SD = 0.87) were more extreme than post-reading beliefs, 
M = 3.26, SD = 1.87; F(1, 124) = 63.99, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .34. 
While there were no main effects of belief status or text 
position (p-values > 0.22), text position interacted with ini-
tial vs post-reading belief ratings, F(1, 124) = 4.07, 
p = 0.046, ηp2 = .03, as did belief status, F(1, 124) = 4.90, 
p = 0.029, ηp2 = .04. These effects were qualified by a belief 
rating x belief status x text position interaction, F(1, 
124) = 25.58, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .17. This three-way interac-
tion shows that belief change occurred more when subjects 
read a belief inconsistent versus a belief consistent text.
Based on the results of this analysis, we collapsed the 
belief status and text position variables into a single 
dichotomous variable that represented the consistency 
between subjects’ initial beliefs and the position of the text 
they read. A text belief consistency (consistent vs incon-
sistent) x belief rating (initial vs post-reading) mixed 
effects ANOVA replicated the results of our initial analy-
sis, revealing a main effect of consistency, F(1, 126) = 19.83, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .14, and belief rating, F(1, 126) = 57.88, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .32, (see Figure 1). These effects were qual-
ified by the predicted two-way interaction, F(1, 
126) = 22.56, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .15. A simple effect test 
among subjects who read a belief consistent text revealed 
that initial (M = 2.06, SD = 0.82) and post-reading (M = 2.48, 
SD = 1.28) belief ratings differed, F(1, 126) = 4.02, 
p = 0.047, ηp2 = .03. Initial (M = 2.23, SD = 0.92) and post-
reading (M = 4.02, SD = 2.04) belief ratings were also dif-
ferent for subjects who read a belief inconsistent text, F(1, 
126) = 77.57, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .38. Simple effects between 
consistency conditions for initial belief ratings revealed no 
significant difference (p = 0.279); however, there was a 
significant difference between post-reading belief ratings 
for subjects whose text was belief consistent (M = 2.48, 
SD = 1.28) versus inconsistent, M = 4.02, SD = 2.04; F(1, 
126) = 25.90, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .17.
Recollection accuracy. Recollection of initial beliefs are also 
shown in Figure 1. To assess if there were systematic dif-
ferences in recollection accuracy as a function of text 
belief consistency, a mixed-effects ANOVA was conducted 
with initial beliefs and recollection of initial beliefs as the 
within subject variable, and text belief consistency as the 
between subject variable. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
this analysis revealed that recollections of initial beliefs 
were more moderate (M = 3.04, SD = 1.72) than initial 
beliefs, M = 2.15, SD = .87; F(1, 126) = 43.66, p = 0.001, 
ηp2 = .26. There was also a main effect of belief consist-
ency, F(1, 126) = 11.36, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .08 that was quali-
fied by the predicted consistency x belief recollection 
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interaction, F(1, 126) = 12.39, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .09. For sub-
jects who read a belief consistent text, initial belief ratings 
(M = 2.06, SD = 0.82) were more extreme than recollec-
tions of those beliefs, M = 2.48, SD = 1.27; F(1, 126) = 4.69, 
p = 0.032, ηp2 = .04. Among subjects who read a belief 
inconsistent text, initial belief ratings (M = 2.23, SD = 0.92) 
were also more extreme than recollections of those beliefs, 
M = 3.58, SD = 1.93, F(1, 126) = 77.57, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .38. 
While there was no difference between text conditions 
among participants’ initial belief ratings (p = 0.286), recol-
lections of initial beliefs were more moderate for subjects 
who read a belief inconsistent text (M = 3.58, SD = 1.93) 
than a belief consistent text, M = 2.48, SD = 1.27; F(1, 
126) = 14.67, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .10.
Sentence reading times. Sentence reading times were ana-
lyzed as a function of belief status and text position, and 
were correlated with measures of belief change and recol-
lection accuracy. Belief change and recollection accuracy 
were calculated by subtracting subjects’ post-reading 
belief rating (or initial belief recollection) from their initial 
belief ratings. To analyze sentence reading times, the sup-
port and refute ratings for each text sentence from the rat-
ing study were used. Support and refute ratings across 
sentences were highly correlated for both the Pro, 
r(118) = –0.93, p < 0.001, and Con text, r(120) = –0.91, 
p < 0.001. Since these ratings were not empirically distinct, 
only support ratings were used in sentence reading time 
analyses. Consistent with Lorch and Myers (1990), sen-
tence reading times for each subject were regressed on six 
traditional predictors of reading times in addition to sup-
port ratings for each sentence.1 Higher beta weights for the 
support ratings from these regressions indicate a reading 
slow down for sentences that are more supportive of the 
proposition after controlling for the six traditional predic-
tors. Lower beta weights indicate a reading speed up for 
sentences that are more supportive of the proposition after 
controlling for the six traditional predictors. These beta 
weights were analyzed with a between subjects ANOVA in 
which initial belief and text position were between sub-
jects variables. Subjects who read the Pro text slowed 
down reading as a function of the supportiveness of sen-
tences (M = 35.99, SD = 202.04) relative to subjects who 
read the Con text, M = –90.00, SD = 202.04; F(1, 
126) = 12.64, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .09. There was no significant 
difference in support beta weights as a function of belief 
status (M = –40.79, SD = 200.87 for disbelievers and 
M = –13.23, SD = 200.87 for believers, F(1, 126) = 0.60, 
p = 0.44, and the belief status x text position interaction 
was not significant, F(1, 126) = 0.79, p = 0.376. Correla-
tions between support beta weights and belief change 
(r = 0.09) and recollection accuracy (r = 0.02) were both 
non-significant.
Sentence recognition and short answer questions. For the 
sentence recognition test, each subject responded to 30 
“old” sentences which were taken from the text they read 
and 30 “new” sentences that were taken from the text they 
did not read. In signal detection terms, “old” responses to 
previously read sentences are hits and “old” responses to 
new sentences are false alarms. Hit rate (HR) and false 
alarm rate (FAR) were combined to create a measure of 
accuracy in discriminating old from new sentences called 
d’ (Swets, 1986), which is calculated from the formula d′= 
Z(HR) – Z(FAR). A d′ of 0 represents chance performance 
at discriminating old from new sentences. d′ increases to 
the extent subjects are successful at responding “old” to 
sentences that were read and “new” to sentences that were 
not read. Prior knowledge and topic importance were 
uncorrelated with d′ and were therefore not included in 
further in analyses. Table 2 shows d′ means and correla-
tions with belief change and recollection accuracy. There 
was no significant difference between d′ scores as a func-
tion of belief consistency (p = 0.593), and d′ scores did not 
significantly correlate with belief change (ps = 0.091 for 
belief inconsistent and 0.812 for belief consistent) or rec-
ollection accuracy (ps = 0.485 for belief inconsistent and 
0.802 for belief consistent).
Subjects’ total score on the short answer test was exam-
ined as a function of belief consistency, and scores were 
correlated with belief change and recollection accuracy 
(see Table 2). There was no significant difference in short 
answer performance as a function of belief consistency 
(p = 0.989) and no significant correlations with belief 
change or recollection accuracy (ps > 0.290). With 10 
questions, and an open-ended number of points possible, 
performance on the short answer questionnaire was poor. 
Figure 1. Initial and post-reading belief ratings, and 
recollection of initial belief ratings as a function of the 
consistency between belief status of the subject (believer/
disbeliever) and position of the text read (pro/con) for 
Experiment 1. Error bars are SEMs.
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Since processing and memory measures did not differ as a 
function of the consistency between the subjects’ initial 
beliefs and the text position, reading times, sentence rec-
ognition and short answer question performance were not 
considered as possible mediators of the relationship 
between belief consistency of the text and recollection 
accuracy.
Mediation analysis. Process modeling (Hayes, 2013) was 
used to test whether the relationship between belief con-
sistency of the text read and recollection accuracy was 
mediated by belief change (see Figure 2). Model 4 (Hayes, 
2013) was used with 1000 bootstrap samples. This model 
accounted for a significant amount of the variance, F(2, 
125) = 22.56, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.58. Text belief consistency 
(0 = consistent; 1 = inconsistent) predicted belief change, 
B = 1.37, SE = .28, t(126) = 4.75, p < 0.001, 95% CI = (0.80, 
1.94), but showed no direct effect on recollection accu-
racy after controlling for the indirect effect belief change 
(p = 0.976). The indirect effect of text belief consistency 
on recollection accuracy via belief change showed signifi-
cant mediation (B = .94 SE(Boot) = .23, 95% CI = [0.52, 
1.43]). The results of this model show that belief change 
was most likely to occur for individuals who read belief 
inconsistent articles. The ratio of indirect versus direct 
effects (B = 158.09, SE(Boot) = 758.47, CI(Boot) = [248.30, 
23923.72]) and indirect to total effects (B = .99, 
SE(Boot) = .34, CI(Boot) = [0.70, 1.63]) further indicates 
that the majority of variance in recollection accuracy that 
is explained by the belief consistency of the text is occur-
ring via belief change.
Discussion
There were two primary findings in Experiment 1. In 
accordance with our hypothesis, subjects experienced 
belief change after they read texts that were inconsistent 
with their initial beliefs. These subjects made large recol-
lection errors when attempting to recall the initial beliefs 
they held prior to reading belief inconsistent texts. Belief 
recollections were closer to current beliefs than they were 
to initial beliefs, which suggests that people have poor 
metacognitive awareness of changes in their beliefs. The 
results of the process model provides preliminary evi-
dence indicating the mechanism by which exposure to 
belief inconsistent information influences recollection 
errors. Exposure to belief inconsistent information leads 
to belief change, which in turn predicts recollection accu-
racy. This mediational effect explains the majority of vari-
ance in recollection accuracy, while the direct effect of 
text belief consistency on recollection accuracy in the 
mediation model was not significant. We found no evi-
dence to support the idea that processing or mental repre-
sentation of the text content is related to awareness of 
belief change. Sentence reading time measures of argu-
ment-focused processing (Wolfe et al., 2013) showed no 
relationship with recollection accuracy. Sentence recogni-
tion accuracy and short answer question performance 
were unrelated to recollection accuracy and belief change.
Table 2. Means (SD) for comprehension tasks and correlations with belief change and recollection accuracy. Significant 
relationships are denoted by * = p < 0.05.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
 Belief consistent Belief inconsistent Belief consistent Belief inconsistent
Means
 d′ 1.21 (0.65) 1.14 (0.66) 0.88 (0.61) 0.82 (0.54)
 Short answer 5.37 (2.24) 5.37 (2.53)  
 Evidence listing 3.63 (2.28) 4.32 (2.36)
Correlation w/ belief change
 d’ –.03 .21 –.26 .03
 Short answer .06 .14  
 Evidence listing –.21 –.08
Correlation w/ recollection accuracy
 d′ –.01 .09 –.08 .01
 Short answer .03 .07  
 Evidence listing –.19 –.19
Figure 2. Process model of direct and indirect (via Belief 
Change) effects of text consistency on recollection accuracy 
for Experiment 1. 
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 represents an attempt to replicate and extend 
the results of Experiment 1. One shortcoming of 
Experiment 1 was that performance on the short answer 
questions was relatively poor, and may not have varied 
enough to capture the potential differences in comprehen-
sion. In order to address this possibility, we incorporated 
an evidence listing task in Experiment 2. In this task, sub-
jects listed as many evidence statements as possible, both 
supporting and refuting the proposition that spanking is 
effective. The sentence-by-sentence reading time proce-
dure was replaced by a more ecologically valid reading 
procedure. Subjects read a hard copy of their assigned text, 
and were instructed to use whatever comprehension meth-
ods they typically use in studying for an exam.
Methods
Subjects. One hundred seventeen subjects from a large 
Midwestern United States University participated in 
exchange for partial credit in an Introductory Psychology 
course. Subjects were selected from a pool of 491 and 
solicited using the same procedure as in Experiment 1. 
Seventy two believed spanking was an effective means of 
discipline, whereas 45 did not. The mean age of the sub-
jects was 18.85 (SD = 1.78) and 76% were female. Sub-
jects were 64% Caucasian, 2% African American, 1% 
Asian American, 3% Hispanic and 30% other/did report 
their race.
Materials. Materials were identical to Experiment 1 with 
the exception that the short answer questions were replaced 
by the evidence listing task.
Procedure. The prescreening procedure was the same as 
Experiment 1 and the experiment took place six to 10 
weeks after the prescreening. As in Experiment 1, partici-
pants completed the prior knowledge procedure. Subjects 
read a hard copy of either the Pro or Con text, which was 
randomly assigned within spanking belief categories. 
Reading instructions were the same as Experiment 1 
except for the moving window instructions. Subjects were 
also instructed that they could take notes or underline parts 
of the text if they wished. After reading, subjects com-
pleted two evidence listing tasks, one for supporting evi-
dence and one for refuting evidence (counterbalanced for 
order). For each task, subjects received a sheet of paper 
with instructions to list as much supporting (refuting) evi-
dence from the text as they could. Instructions stated that 
“The evidence you list could be either data that were pre-
sented, or arguments addressing spanking effectiveness 
that were supported by reasons.” A prompt stated “Spank-
ing is an effective (ineffective) means of discipline because 
_____.”After listing as much supporting or refuting evi-
dence as they could, subjects were given the second sheet 
of paper and listed evidence for the opposite side of the 
topic. Next, subjects completed the sentence recognition 
task, post-reading belief rating and initial belief recollec-
tion questions.
Results
Results are organized in a manner similar to Experiment 1 
and address the same questions. Namely, do subjects show 
poor recollection accuracy for initial beliefs following 
belief change, and if so, is the relationship between belief 
consistency of the text and recollection accuracy mediated 
by belief change? Moreover, do belief change and recol-
lection accuracy relate to performance on the sentence rec-
ognition and evidence listing tasks?
Initial beliefs, text position and belief change. As in Experi-
ment 1, an absolute measure of belief strength among sub-
jects was calculated by reverse scoring belief ratings for 
believers in spanking as an effective form of discipline. 
Lower ratings indicate more extreme beliefs, whereas 
higher ratings indicate more moderate beliefs. See Figure 
3 for means.
We again examined beliefs as a function of belief status 
and text position to ensure that belief change was greater 
for subjects who read a belief inconsistent text compared to 
a belief consistent text. A mixed-effects ANOVA was con-
ducted with belief status (believer vs disbeliever) and text 
position (pro vs con) as between subjects variables, and 
belief rating (initial vs post-reading) as a within subjects 
variable. This analysis showed that initial belief ratings 
(M = 2.26, SD = 0.80) were more extreme than post-reading 
ratings, M = 3.30, SD = 1.70; F(1, 113) = 61.06, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = .35. There were no main effects of belief status or text 
position (ps > 0.362) and text position did not interact with 
belief status (p > 0.517). However, belief status did interact 
with initial vs post-reading ratings, F(1, 113) = 16.96, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .13. This effect was qualified by the pre-
dicted text position x belief status x initial vs post-reading 
rating interaction, F(1, 113) = 24.06, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .18. 
This analysis indicates that belief inconsistent texts elicited 
greater belief change than belief consistent texts.
As in Experiment 1, subjects were categorized as hav-
ing read either a belief consistent or belief inconsistent 
spanking text (see Figure 3). A consistency (consistent vs 
inconsistent) x belief rating (initial vs post-reading) mixed-
effects ANOVA revealed a main effect of consistency, F(1, 
115) = 10.38, p = 0.002, ηp2 = .08, and belief rating, F(1, 
115) = 43.83, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .28. These effects were quali-
fied by the predicted two-way interaction, F(1, 115) = 20.97, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .15. A simple effect test among subjects 
who read a belief consistent text revealed that initial and 
post-reading belief ratings did not differ (p = 0.157). 
However, initial (M = 2.18, SD = 0.81) and post-reading 
(M = 3.92, SD = 1.80) beliefs did differ among subjects 
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who read a belief inconsistent text, F(1, 115) = 64.37, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .36. Simple effects between consistency 
conditions for initial belief ratings revealed no significant 
difference (p = 0.313); however, there was a significant dif-
ference between post-reading belief ratings for subjects 
whose text was belief consistent (M = 2.65, SD = 1.33) ver-
sus inconsistent, M = 3.92, SD = 1.80; F(1, 115) = 18.65, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .14; see Figure 3.
Recollection accuracy. Recollections of initial beliefs 
are shown in Figure 3. To assess if text belief consistency 
affected recollection accuracy, we conducted a mixed 
effects ANOVA. Initial beliefs and recollection of ini-
tial beliefs were analyzed as a within subjects variable, 
and belief consistency was a between subjects variable. 
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, there was a main 
effect of belief rating such that recollections of initial 
beliefs were more moderate (M = 3.30, SD = 1.70) than 
actual initial beliefs, M = 2.26, SD = .80; F(1, 115) = 43.83, 
p = 0.001, ηp2 = .28. There was a main effect of belief con-
sistency, F(1, 115) = 10.38, p = 0.002, ηp2 = .08, which 
was qualified by a belief consistency x recollection inter-
action, F(1, 115) = 11.29, p = 0.003, ηp2 = .08. A simple 
effect test for subjects who read a belief consistent text 
revealed that initial belief ratings (M = 2.33, SD = 0.79) 
were more extreme than recollection of those beliefs, 
M = 2.75, SD = 1.31; F(1, 115) = 4.26, p = 0.041, ηp2 = .03. 
Among subjects who read the belief inconsistent text, 
initial belief ratings (M = 2.18, SD = 0.81) were more 
extreme than recollections of those beliefs, M = 3.48, 
SD = 1.73; F(1, 115) = 42.79, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .27. There 
were no significant differences in initial belief rat-
ings as a function of text belief consistency (p = 0.313). 
Finally, recollections of initial beliefs were more moder-
ate for subjects who read a belief inconsistent (M = 3.48, 
SD = 1.73) compared to a belief consistent text, M = 2.75, 
SD = 1.31; F(1, 115) = 6.53, p = 0.012, ηp2 = .05.
Sentence recognition and evidence listing. Sentence rec-
ognition was analyzed in the same manner as Experiment 
1 (see Table 2). There again was no significant difference 
in discrimination accuracy (d′) for subjects who read a 
belief consistent text compared to a belief inconsistent text 
(p = 0.537). Evidence listing data were scored by match-
ing listing statements to arguments and evidence in the 
text. For each text, a list of both supporting and refuting 
arguments and evidence were created. Subjects’ lists of 
supporting arguments and evidence were matched to the 
supporting list, and refuting arguments and evidence were 
matched to the refuting list. Statements that were listed but 
not in the text were not analyzed. Two raters scored a set 
of 20 subjects (Kappa = .74), then one rater scored the rest 
of the subjects. The total number of arguments listed for 
each subject was analyzed as a function of belief consist-
ency (see Table 2), and were not significantly different, 
(p = 0.112). Correlations between d′ and evidence listing 
data with belief change and recollection accuracy are 
also presented in Table 2. There were no significant cor-
relations among any of these measures (ps > 0.145). As a 
result, these comprehension measures were not considered 
as possible mediators in the relationship between belief 
consistency and recollection accuracy.
Mediation analysis. As in Experiment 1, process mod-
eling (Hayes, 2013) was used to examine whether the 
relationship between belief consistency of the text read 
and recollection accuracy was mediated by belief change. 
Belief change and recollection accuracy were calculated 
in the same way as Experiment 1. Model 4 (Hayes, 2013) 
was used with 1000 bootstrap samples. This model 
accounted for a significant amount of the variance, F(2, 
114) = 53.86, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.49. Text belief consist-
ency (0 = consistent; 1 = inconsistent) predicted belief 
change, B = 1.42, SE = .31, t(115) = 4.58, p < 0.001, 95% 
CI = (0.80, 2.03). The indirect effect of text belief consist-
ency on recollection accuracy via belief change showed 
significant mediation (B = .87, SE(Boot) = .23, 95% 
CI(Boot) = [0.48, 1.42], see Figure 4), but there was no 
direct effect on recollection accuracy after controlling for 
the indirect effect of belief change (p = 0.962). The results 
of this model show that belief change was most likely 
to occur for individuals who read a belief inconsistent 
text. The ratio of indirect versus direct effects (B = 80.00, 
SE(Boot) = 1277.01, CI(Boot) = [90.19, 40255.63], 
and indirect to total effects, B = .99, SE(Boot) = 1.82, 
CI(Boot) = (0.59, 1.97) further indicates that the major-
ity of variance in recollection accuracy that is explained 
by text belief consistency is occurring via belief change.
Figure 3. Initial and post-reading belief ratings, and 
recollection of initial belief ratings as a function of the 
consistency between belief status of the subject (believer/
disbeliever) and position of the text read (pro/con) for 
Experiment 2. Error bars are SEMs.
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 show the same pattern of 
effects for belief change and recollection accuracy that 
were observed in Experiment 1. Subjects changed their 
beliefs in the direction of the text position, and recollection 
of their initial beliefs were more similar to post-reading 
beliefs than to initial beliefs. In particular, the relationship 
between the belief consistency of the text read and recol-
lection accuracy was strongly mediated by belief change. 
Measures of recognition memory, as well as evidence and 
argument listing on both sides of the topic, did not predict 
either belief change or recollection accuracy.
General discussion
Across two experiments, people showed evidence of poor 
metacognitive awareness of belief change about a social 
science topic. Following belief change, recollections of 
initial beliefs were generally inaccurate and biased toward 
current beliefs. In mediation analyses in both experiments, 
results showed that the relationship between the belief 
consistency of the text read by a person and their accuracy 
at recollecting their initial belief was mediated by their 
level of belief change. These results suggest that recollec-
tions of previous beliefs are constructive, and influenced 
by the beliefs of the person at the time of the recollection. 
We propose that changes in beliefs do not tend to be moni-
tored as they happen. Rather, we propose that people sim-
ply use salient information at the moment of recollection 
to try to reconstruct their previous beliefs.
The nature of these metacognitive errors mirror those 
found in attitude studies (Bem & McConnell, 1970; 
Goethals & Reckman, 1973; Levine, 1997; Levine & 
Safer, 2002; Markus, 1986). However, this is the first study 
to demonstrate poor metacognitive awareness of belief 
change. In both experiments, measures of processing 
(Experiment 1) and mental representation (Experiments 1 
and 2) failed to predict the accuracy of belief recollections. 
Thus, the current studies failed to provide evidence for the 
idea that subjects who comprehend a text at a higher level 
are more aware of changes in their beliefs.
The fluency hypothesis from metacognitive monitor-
ing research (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013) provides a poten-
tial explanation for this metacognitive error. While people 
have beliefs about spanking effectiveness, they likely 
have little knowledge of the scientific research on this 
topic. Consequently, the beliefs reported in the prescreen-
ing may have been constructed from a memory represen-
tation that included general feelings about the topic or 
personal experiences. After reading, people’s memory 
representation was likely dominated by the text content 
and the beliefs that arose from their interpretation of the 
content (Kintsch, 1998). According to the fluency hypoth-
esis, these beliefs then would have influenced the recol-
lection of subjects’ initial beliefs. Two patterns in the 
observed results substantiate this interpretation. First, 
belief change was a strong mediator of the relationship 
between text belief consistency and recollection accuracy. 
This result suggests that the interpretation of the text con-
tent is salient at the time of recollection and influences 
recollection processes.2 The mediation analyses also indi-
cate that the direct effect of text belief consistency on rec-
ollection accuracy was not significant. Thus, there is no 
evidence to indicate that the text affects recollection accu-
racy independent of its influence on beliefs. Second, in 
both experiments, none of the measures of processing or 
mental representation predicted belief change or recollec-
tion accuracy. While caution must be used when interpret-
ing null findings, none of the measures from the current 
experiments indicate that understanding of text content is 
related to the recollection process.
Comprehension monitoring research suggests that 
when available cues provide a valid assessment of the 
mental representation, then judgments of comprehension 
are relatively accurate (Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 
2003; Thiede et al., 2010; Wiley et al., 2005). These cues 
tend to be more accurate when they require subjects to 
make judgments about their understanding of the general 
meaning of a text rather than their superficial memory or 
sense of familiarity with the topic. However, recollection 
of previous beliefs is likely a more difficult task than judg-
ments of comprehension. First, accurate metacognitive 
awareness of belief change requires a person to be aware 
not only of their current beliefs, but to accurately recon-
struct a mental representation from a previous time. People 
may have little to no familiarity with this type of judgment, 
and metacognition experiments tend to require subjects to 
assess either their present comprehension, or performance 
in the future (e.g., Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). Second, in 
recollecting a previous belief, there is no particular text 
memory or learning experience to try to recollect. Beliefs 
may have been relatively ill-formed, and may have even 
been generated at the time they were initially reported. 
Thus, it may be that when people attempt to recollect pre-
vious beliefs, at least under some circumstances, they are 
attempting to recollect a memory representation that was 
Figure 4. Process model of direct and indirect (via Belief 
Change) effects of text consistency on recollection accuracy 
for Experiment 2.
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weak to begin with. The potential discrepancy in memory 
strength between initial beliefs and beliefs generated after 
reading is consistent with our claim that current beliefs are 
more salient at the time of recollection of initial beliefs. 
Schwarz (2007) makes a similar argument about attitudes, 
suggesting that they are contextually constructed at the 
time a person reports them rather than stable, stored prop-
erties of long-term memory.
Another potential interpretation of these results is that 
they arise from beliefs about belief change (Mueller et al., 
2016; Ross, 1989). In particular, subjects may be acting 
according to Ross’ (1989) implicit theory of stability. 
According to this theory, people may assume that their 
beliefs about spanking effectiveness are stable. If so, the 
task of recollecting previous beliefs is one in which current 
beliefs are assessed and an assumption is made that previ-
ous beliefs must be similar. After belief change, people 
may assume that their current beliefs must be the same or 
similar as their previous beliefs. Fluency and beliefs about 
belief change are not mutually exclusive explanations for 
the results presented here, and so further exploration of the 
mechanisms underlying metacognitive awareness of belief 
change will be needed.
The current claim that people have poor metacognitive 
awareness of belief changes is also consistent with experi-
ments in the attitude literature in which perceived attitude 
change fails to correspond with attitude change when it is 
assessed using pre and post measures (Corner et al., 2012; 
Miller et al., 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997). These experi-
ments were designed to address the phenomenon of atti-
tude polarization (Lord et al., 1979), in which subjects 
read arguments on both sides of a controversial issue and 
reported more polarized attitudes than before reading. 
Evidence in support of attitude polarization is most com-
monly found when the dependent variable is perceived 
attitude change. However, when attitude change is meas-
ured by differences between pre and post ratings, the 
results do not tend to support attitude polarization. As we 
have argued, perceived change is a metacognitive meas-
ure, and is dependent on an accurate recollection of previ-
ous attitudes in order to be valid. Thus, it is possible that 
some attitude polarization findings may actually reflect 
poor metacognitive awareness of attitude change.
Relationships between comprehension, belief 
change and awareness of belief change
In this research, we also examined the memory representa-
tion that people formed as a result of comprehending infor-
mation in a one-sided scientific text. No evidence was 
found to suggest that people differed in comprehension 
success as a function of whether they believed or did not 
believe the information they read. This finding is consist-
ent with other research in which no belief-related differ-
ences in comprehension success were found (Bohn-Gettler 
& McCrudden, 2017; Wolfe et al., 2013). While some 
researchers have found evidence that people put more pro-
cessing effort into belief inconsistent information (Edwards 
& Smith, 1996), the processing data from Experiment 1 
contradicts this idea. Moreover, there was no evidence to 
indicate the existence of a relationship between compre-
hension success and either belief change or recollection 
accuracy. It is therefore left to future research to explore 
whether comprehension processes may relate to metacog-
nitive awareness of belief change.
Conclusion
These experiments are the first to indicate that when peo-
ple change their beliefs, they show biased memory for 
their previous beliefs. These results also suggest that peo-
ple are unaware of these changes, which are primarily 
influenced by their beliefs at the moment they make this 
metacognitive judgment. An area where this bias is likely 
to emerge is in the domain of science text comprehension. 
Science educators, and authors who write about science 
for the general public, encourage people to change their 
beliefs to match the preponderance of evidence on a topic. 
However, the current evidence suggests that people may 
be less willing to meaningfully consider belief inconsistent 
material if they feel that their beliefs are unlikely to change 
as a consequence. Moreover, people who do meaningfully 
engage with such material may be unaware of the extent to 
which their beliefs are shaped by evidence they read. The 
present research indicates that an important component of 
overall science literacy may be to develop a more refined 
understanding of the extent to which evidence can poten-
tially change people’s beliefs. As such, the practical conse-
quences of this type of metacognitive error will be 
important to examine in future research.
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Notes
1. Each sentence was scored on six dimensions established 
in previous research to be significant predictors of read-
ing times in expository text comprehension. The number of 
syllables per sentence was included to capture word level 
processing (Zwaan et al., 1995). The number of new noun 
concepts per sentence (new argument nouns) and a binary 
code indicating whether a sentence shares a noun con-
cept with the previous sentence (argument overlap) were 
included to capture sentence level processing (Graesser, 
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Hoffman, & Clark, 1980; Zwaan et al., 1995). Situation 
level variables included were binary codes indicating topic 
and summary sentences, and the serial position of a sentence 
within each section of a text (Britton, 1994).
2. One limitation of the fluency hypothesis in the current 
research is that in both experiments, current beliefs were 
reported before recollection of previous beliefs. In subse-
quent research (Wolfe, Williams, Geers, Hessler, & Simon, 
2014), we manipulated the order in which subjects report 
current beliefs vs recollecting previous beliefs. This order 
manipulation had no influence on either current beliefs or 
recollections.
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